Octrooirecht - Droit des brevets  

W. Pors, B. Vandermeulen, Bird & Bird submission on the Rules of Procedure for the Unified Patent Court, brief 30 september 2013.
Ingezonden door Wouter Pors, Bird & Bird gericht aan het Prepatory Committee van het Unified Patent Court: On behalf of Bird & Bird LLP we hereby submit our comments on the Draft Rules of Procedure for the Unified Patent Court as published on the website on 31 May 2013. This submission was prepared by the International UPC Steering Group of Bird & Bird, which comprises patent litigators and patent attorneysin the various countries in which we practise. We have also been involved in the preparation of the submissions of AIPPI and EPLAW and have taken these submissions into account. We have further also taken the epi submission into account. This submission represents our independent professional view of the Rules of Procedure and is made to support the further improvement of the envisaged system.

We have taken the UPC Agreement as a given starting point that currently cannot be changed any more, which does not mean that we support all choices made in that Agreement. However, in some instances we cannot avoid suggesting some small amendments to the Agreement, but only where we think such amendments do not touch on political issues.

Lees de gehele bijdrage hier.

Technical Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office, 11 July 2013, ECLI:EP:BA:2013:T167007.20130711 (Nokia Siemens Networks - Method for planning a shopping trip using a mobile device)
Met samenvatting van John Allen, NautaDutilh.
In the continuing search for clarification of the patentability and inventive step criteria for computer implemented inventions, a Technical Board of Appeal of the EPO has used surprisingly clear wording to stop computer implemented inventions from expanding into the realm of functional, business method type claims. It has become more or less standard for applicants to argue that because of an "interaction" between basic technical features (such as processors, memories and displays) with "non-technical" features (e.g. certain specific data), the claim as a whole could constitute a patentable invention. It is exactly the nature of this "interaction" that is discussed in the recent decision T-1670/07. The EPO now warns that a lot of these arguments are considered "fallacies".

Shopping, anyone?
The case concerned the refusal of the grant of European Patent Application EP 1 216 450 ("EP 450") as applied for by Nokia. Nokia's application relates to a method and system of shopping with a mobile device to purchase goods and/or services. In short, the users would enter some of the items he (or she) would be looking for on his shopping spree, and a server in connection with the mobile device would identify the best shops to go or plan the shortest possible round trip. A great idea for those who regard shopping as a necessary evil, but a patentable invention?On appeal from a refusal by the Examining Division, the discussion before the Board centred around the question of whether identifying goods, identifying vendors and planning a shopping trip with the aid of a mobile device in contact with a server resulted in a patentable invention?

On appeal from a refusal by the Examining Division, the discussion before the Board centred around the question of whether identifying goods, identifying vendors and planning a shopping trip with the aid of a mobile device in contact with a server resulted in a patentable invention.

Technical effects: sold out?
In the earlier stage of the prosecution the examining division had described the object of the "invention" as "providing a technical means to optimise an itinerary" (shopping trip). It was deemed to lack an inventive step.

On appeal the Technical Board went some steps further and held that providing the user with a choice of an order of visiting shops and (thus) making the itinerary a function of the user profile, did not involve any technical effect at all. The Board rejected Nokia's argument that non-technical features "interacted" with technical features such as to provide an overall technical effect.

Citing older case law, the Board considered that what was required as the result of such an interaction, would be a "real" technical effect. For example, where software interacted with an X-ray apparatus and the result was a longer lifespan of an X-ray tube, there is a clear technical effect. If on the other hand the interaction results only in the display of different information on a screen, there is no technical effect.

The Board's view on "software patenting fallacies"
Discussing the "interaction" arguments raised by Nokia, the Board described these as different typical "fallacy" arguments. Relying on the interaction between the technical features (e.g. the server) and the non-technical features was described as the "technical leakage fallacy", i.e. the intrinsic technical nature of the implementation "leaks back into the intrinsically non-technical nature of the problem". Secondly, the fact that a user of the alleged invention was presented with a "possible choice" as to his shopping trip was described as the "broken technical chain fallacy": a technical effect might result from a user's reaction to information, but this also shows that a technical process is "broken by the intervention of the user" and any technical effect becomes dependant on the "mental activities of the user".

More generally the Board held that where the provision or generation of data is a key feature of the invention, a technical effect may arise from "either the provision of data about a technical process" (such as status information on the operation of a machine or device) or from "the provision of data that is applied directly in a technical process". Neither applied in this case.

So what's the problem?
Turning back to the technical problem, the Board held that describing the problem underlying the alleged invention as " providing a technique which has greater flexibility and can provide results tailored to the user's preferences is not a technical problem and is too general. The Board added that even where the claimed subject matter was different from the prior art and no clear reason could be found for modifying the prior art, this does not mean that there is an inventive step. This reasoning - according to the Board a "non-technical prejudice fallacy" - disregards that it is not so much why, but rather how the prior art was modified. If conventional technical features are used and these perform their tasks in an obvious way, there is no technical reason why the skilled person would refrain from making changes to the prior art. To summarize, the skilled person is basically, in a technical sense doing the same thing: in this case he is planning a shopping trip where two or more items could be bought from multiple vendors, as opposed to the solution in the prior art: identifying just one vendor who has all the items available. The Board held that there was no technical reason why a skilled person would not make this particular modification.

Analysis
The Board did not depart from its "technical contribution" doctrine where even trivial technical claim features would be sufficient to escape the patentable subject matter exclusions ("software as such" and "presentation of information as such".

However, the Board appears to be raising the bar in certain respects, particularly by specifying the nature of the "interaction" that is required between technical and non-technical claim features. Applicants and litigants should take notice of the "red flags" that the Board raises for computer implemented inventions. Particularly, certain types claims may particularly be regarded as "suspect":

• claims that essentially deal with standard human behavioural concepts such as going to the bank or going shopping;
• claims that provide for a technical effect or outcome, depending on the reaction of the user;
• claims said to provide for abstract solutions such as "greater flexibility", "customization"," individualization" etc.; and
• claims using functional langue in combination with trivial/well known technical features (such as standard hardware), especially where the patent does not specify how (i.e. in which technical way) the conventional hardware is to be modified.

Verslag Forum/ExCo van AIPPI International, Helsinki, 5-10 september 2013.
Octrooien, bekende merken, duur van het auteursrecht, schadevergoeding, plain packaging, Unified Patent Court.
Van 5-10 september vond het Forum/ExCo van AIPPI plaats in Helsinki. Ongeveer 15 leden van de VIE, de Nederlandse groep van AIPPI, waren daarbij aanwezig. Tijdens het ExCo zijn er vier nieuwe resoluties aangenomen naar aanleiding van de zgn. working questions:
Q233: Grace period for patents
Q234: Relevant public for determining the degree of recognition of famous marks, well-known marks and marks with reputation
Q235: Term of copyright protection
Q236: Relief in IP proceedings other than injunctions or damages

De teksten van deze resoluties zijn tot stand gekomen op basis van de rapporten die door de diverse nationale groepen zijn opgesteld en op basis van de debatten die in Helsinki hebben plaatsgevonden.

Verder is er in Helsinki gedebatteerd over een resolutie over ‘plain packaging’ naar aanleiding van nieuwe wetgeving in Australië en voorgestelde wetgeving in de EU die fabrikanten van rookwaren beperkingen opleggen over de wijze waarop zij hun merk mogen voeren op verpakkingen van tabaksproducten. In Helsinki werd nog geen consensus bereikt. Er ligt een concepttekst voor een resolutie waarover binnen enkele dagen elektronisch alsnog door het Executive Committee zal worden gestemd in de hoop dat er op tijd voor de stemming door het Europees parlement een resolutie zal zijn aangenomen.

Ook is er wederom gedebatteerd over het Unified Patent Court. Het Executive Committee heeft een Position Paper aangenomen dat ingestuurd zal worden in het kader van de public consultation over de Draft Rules of Procedure.

In 2014 zal er weer een World Congress zijn. Dit zal plaatsvinden in Toronto van 14 – 18 september. Daar zullen wederom delegates van alle nationale groepen discussiëren over vier nieuwe vragen met de bedoeling daarvoor resoluties aan te nemen. De vragen die in Toronto aan de orde zullen komen zijn:
Q238: Second medical use or indication claims
Q239: The basic mark requirement under the Madrid system
Q240: Exhaustion issues in copyright law
Q241: IP licensing and insolvency

Leden van de VIE kunnen zich nu vast bij het secretariaat aanmelden voor deelname aan een werkgroep voor één of meer van de vragen. Zodra de working guidelines door het Bureau van AIPPI in Zwitserland zijn opgesteld, zullen de werkgroepen aan het werk kunnen.

Zie voorgaande verslag AIPPI World Congres Seoul: IEF 11939

P. van Gemert en W. Pors, The effect of an opt out under Article 83 of the agreement on a Unified Patent Court on Jurisdiction for decisions on the merits and preliminary injunctions
Een bijdrage van Peter van Gemert en Wouter Pors, Bird & Bird.

1. The Unified Patent Court and the issue of Article 83
Since the Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2012, implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection (Unitary Patent Regulation) and the Council Regulation (EU) No 1260/2012 of 17 December 2012, implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation ar-rangements (Regulation on Translation Arrangements) have been adopted in December 2012 and following that the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPC Agreement) was signed on 19 February 2013, the creation of a Unitary Patent and of a Unified Patent Court to enforce it seem to be making steady progress towards implementation, which is expected early 2015. As of then, Unitary Patents, with effect in all Member States partici-pating in the enhanced cooperation can be obtained and the first action can then be launched in the Unified Patent Court.

It is clear that the Unified Patent Court will have exclusive jurisdiction for the infringe-ment and validity of Unitary Patents right from the start, without any exception. In addi-tion to that, the Court is also intended to have exclusive jurisdiction for traditional Euro-pean patents, which will remain a permanent alternative for the Unitary Patent. Howev-er, giving unconditional exclusive jurisdiction for those patents to a court that does not exist yet and that will apply rules that are not yet completely known was one step too far. Therefore, the UPC Agreement contains a transitional regime which will initially apply for a period of at least 7 years, but may even be prolonged.

(...)

2. The effect of an opt out on actions on the merits

Basically there are two possible interpretations. First, the phrase “opt out from the exclu-sive competence” may simply have been worded that way because Article 32 contains the phrase that “the Court shall have exclusive competence in respect of” and may thus have been intended as a simple reference to the competence of the Court in general, which happens to include the word “exclusive” in Article 32. This interpretation would indeed mean that an opt out for a given traditional European patent fully blocks out the Unified Patent Court’s competence with regard to that patent.

3. Preliminary injunctions

(...)

The issue gets even more complicated in case of a preliminary injunction. Article 24(1)a UPCA provides that Union law takes priority over the UPC Agreement and Article 31 UP-CA provides that jurisdiction shall be established in accordance with the Brussels I Regu-lation. Also, in view of the light of Article 5 Unitary Patent Regulation and its history, it is quite clear that both the European Union and the contracting Member States of the en-hanced cooperation agreed that Union law should have priority. Now, Article 35 of the Brussels I Regulation (recast) provides that “application may be made to the courts of a Member State for such provisional, including protective, measures as may be available under the law of that Member State, even if the courts of another Member State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter”. Under Consideration 11 of the Brussels I Regulation (recast) and certainly under the proposed Brussels I Amendment it is clear the Unified Patent Court is a court as meant in Article 35.

Uitspraak en samenvatting ingezonden door Jenny Cromsigt, V.O.

India heeft een octrooi van GSK ongeldig verklaard dat gericht was op het medicijn Tykerb. Tykerb is een medicijn tegen kanker en bevat een ditosylate  vorm van de originele stof lapatinib en wordt gebruikt om vrouwen te behandelen met gevorderde borst kanker.

GSK heeft voor zowel Tykerb als voor lapatinib octrooi aangevraagd in India. De Indiase Octrooi Hoger Beroepsraad (IPAB) heeft het octrooi op de originele stof, Iapatinib in stand gehouden maar  vond dat Tykerb niet voldoende verbeterde therapeutisch werkzaamheid bezat ten opzichte van lapatinib om een octrooi te verlenen. Deze afwijzing is op grond van een speciale regel in de Indiase octrooiwet  Sectie 3 (d). Deze regel zegt dat een nieuwe vorm van een bekende stof geen octrooibare materie oplevert als deze geen verbetering van de reeds bekende werkzaamheid heeft . Deze regel is relevant voor nieuwe vormen zoals zouten en andere kristalvormen. Als de basis stof zelf al bekend is dan is het zout daarvan niet octrooieerbaar in India, als deze geen sterk verhoogde therapeutisch werkzaamheid heeft ten opzichte van het basis medicijn. Dit is in tegenstelling tot de meeste andere landen, waar nieuwe zouten en/of kristalvormen, mits nieuw en inventief, wel octrooieerbaar zijn.

De uitspraak volgt een lijn waarin India geen octrooi verleend wordt aan stoffen die een kleine veranderingen/verbeteringen zijn van reeds bekende stoffen. In april van dit jaar was een octrooi van Novartis AG gericht op het kanker medicijn Glivec ook al ongeldig verklaard, net als vorig jaar een octrooi op kanker medicijn Sutent van Pfizer, als ook een octrooi op Pegasys tegen Hepatitis C van Roche, en een octrooi op Merck’s asthma aerosol formulatie.

Zie eerder IEF 12858. Volgens artikel 10 Rules of Procedure bij de Enlarged Board of Appeal kunnen derden bij de griffie van de Grote Kamer van Beroep schriftelijke verklaringen indienen vóór eind november 2013 (case number G 2/13). Conform article 112(1)(a)EPC heeft de Technical Board of Appeal de Enlarged Board of Appeal in de zaak T 83/05 de volgende vragen gesteld :

1. Can the exclusion of essentially biological processes for the production of plants in Article 53(b) EPC have a negative effect on the allowability of a product claim directed to plants or plant material such as plant parts?

2. In particular:

(a) Is a product-by-process claim directed to plants or plant material other than a plant variety allowable if its process features define an essentially biological process for the production of plants?
(b) Is a claim directed to plants or plant material other than a plant variety allowable even if the only method available at the filing date for generating the claimed subject-matter is an essentially biological process for the production of plants disclosed in the patent application?
3. Is it of relevance in the context of questions 1 and 2 that the protection conferred by the product claim encompasses the generation of the claimed product by means of an essentially biological process for the production of plants excluded as such under Article 53(b) EPC?
4. If a claim directed to plants or plant material other than a plant variety is considered not allowable because the plant product claim encompasses the generation of the claimed product by means of a process excluded from patentability under Article 53(b) EPC, is it possible to waive the protection for such generation by "disclaiming" the excluded process?

The Enlarged Board of Appeal considering the referral will be composed as follows: W. van der Eijk (Chairman), B. Günzel, C. Floyd, R. Menapace, U. Oswald, J. Riolo, G. Weiss.

Third parties are hereby given the opportunity to file written statements in accordance with Article 10 of the Rules of Procedure of the Enlarged Board of Appeal (OJ EPO 2007, 303 ff) in one of the official languages of the EPO (English, French or German).

To ensure that any such statements can be given due consideration they should be filed by the end of November 2013 with the Registry of the Enlarged Board of Appeal, quoting case number G 2/13.

Each statement should also be accompanied by a list of cited documents and copies on paper or, preferably, CD/DVD of any such documents not previously filed.

Besluit van de Raad van Bestuur van 27 juni 2012 tot wijziging van regel 53 van het Uitvoeringsreglement bij het Europees Octrooiverdrag (CA/D 7/12), Trb. 2013, nr. 127.
De Raad van Bestuur van de Europese Octrooiorganisatie, Gelet op het Europees Octrooiverdrag en artikel 33, eerste lid, onderdeel c, in het bijzonder, Op voorstel van de President van het Europees Octrooibureau, Gelet op het advies van de Commissie Octrooirecht, Besluit het volgende: Artikel 1

1. Regel 53 van het Uitvoeringsreglement bij het Europees Octrooiverdrag wordt als volgt gewijzigd:
Het derde lid luidt als volgt:

3. Indien de eerdere aanvrage niet in een officiële taal van het Europees Octrooibureau is gesteld en de geldigheid van het beroep op voorrang van belang is voor het vaststellen van de octrooieerbaarheid van de betreffende uitvinding, verzoekt het Europees Octrooibureau de aanvrager of de houder van het Europees octrooi binnen een te stellen termijn een vertaling van die aanvrage in een van de officiële talen in te dienen. In plaats van de vertaling kan een verklaring dat de Europese octrooiaanvrage een volledige vertaling is van de eerdere aanvrage worden overgelegd. Het tweede lid is van overeenkomstige toepassing. Indien de verzochte vertaling van een eerdere aanvrage niet op tijd wordt ingediend, vervalt het recht van voorrang voor de Europese octrooiaanvrage of voor het Europees octrooi ter zake van die aanvrage. De aanvrager of houder van het Europees octrooi wordt daarvan in kennis gesteld.”

Artikel 2
1. Dit besluit treedt in werking op 1 april 2013.
2. Regel 53 van het Europees Octrooiverdrag, zoals gewijzigd bij artikel 1 van dit besluit, is van toepassing op Europese en Euro-PCT-aanvragen alsmede op Europese octrooien ter zake waarvan op de datum van inwerkingtreding van de gewijzigde bepaling nog geen verzoek uit hoofde van regel 53, derde lid, van het Europees Octrooiverdrag is gedaan.

GEDAAN te München op 27 juni 2012

Voor de Raad van Bestuur
De Voorzitter
(w.g.) Jesper KONGSTAD

Prejudiciële vragen gesteld aan HvJ EU 17 april 2013, zaak C-364/13 (International Stem Cell Corporation)
Prejudiciële vragen gesteld door High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Patents Court (Verenigd Koninkrijk). Zie eerder IEF 12611, nu met vertaalde vragen. Octrooien. Richtlijn 98/44/EG betreffende de rechtsbescherming van biotechnologische uitvindingen.

Verzoekster heeft twee octrooiaanvragen ingediend voor de productie van menselijke embryonale stamcellen. Deze worden geweigerd omdat verweerder van mening is dat de in de octrooiaanvragen beschreven uitvindingen volgens de Octrooiwet van Verenigd Koninkrijk (de omzetting van RL 98/44) van octrooiering zijn uitgesloten. Het gaat om de betekenis van de term ‘menselijk embryo’ in de RL. In het bijzonder rijst de vraag wat het Hof in zaak C-34/10, Brüstle bedoelde met de uitdrukking „het proces van ontwikkeling tot een mens in gang zetten”. De verwijzende rechter vraagt zich af of daarmee wordt gedoeld op het in gang zetten van een proces waaruit een menselijk wezen moet kunnen ontstaan? Of ziet die uitdrukking ook op het in gang zetten van een ontwikkelingsproces, ook al kan het proces niet worden voltooid, zodat daaruit geen menselijk wezen kan ontstaan?

In de punten 7 tot en met 16 wordt ‘de ontwikkeling van een menselijk wezen’ beschreven, alsmede wat wordt verstaan onder ‘parthenogenese’ (embryogenese zonder bevruchting).

Verweerder meent ook dat er behoefte is aan verduidelijking van de door het Hof gegeven uitspraak in Brüstle, en dat het onzeker is of het Hof met betrekking tot parthenoten tot hetzelfde besluit zou zijn gekomen op basis van de huidige feiten, aangezien het duidelijk is dat parthenoten en bevruchte eicellen, ondanks de oppervlakkige gelijkenissen in de aanvankelijke ontwikkeling ervan, in geen enkel stadium identiek zijn. In dat opzicht is het mogelijk dat in de schriftelijke opmerkingen die in de zaak Brüstle bij het Hof zijn ingediend, de technische achtergrond zoals die op heden wordt begrepen niet accuraat was samengevat.

De rechter legt dan ook de volgende vraag voor aan het HvJEU:

“Vallen onbevruchte menselijke eicellen, die werden gestimuleerd tot deling en verdere ontwikkeling middels parthenogenese, en die anders dan bevruchte eicellen enkel pluripotente cellen bevatten en zich niet kunnen ontwikkelen tot menselijke wezens, onder de term „menselijke embryo’s” bedoeld in artikel 6, lid 2, sub c, van richtlijn 98/44/EG betreffende de rechtsbescherming van biotechnologische uitvindingen?”

United States Court of Appeals for the ninth circuit 16 juli 2013, nr. 11-15605 (Kimble en Grabb tegen Marvel Enterprises Inc.)
Amerika. Octrooirecht. Contractenrecht. Royalties. Kimble (uitvinder van een spiderman-speelgoed) verliest de voordelen van de in 2001 gesloten licentieovereenkomst.

De Court of Appeals bevestigt het vonnis van de district court in het voordeel van Marvel Enterprises Inc., inhoudende dat de betaling van de royalties hadden moeten worden beëindigd op het moment dat het octrooi voor het Spiderman-speelgoed - de Web Blaster - verliep. De Court of Appeals oordeelde dat op grond van Brulotte v. Thys Co. (1964) een zogenoemde hybride licentieovereenkomst welke onafscheidelijke 'patent and non-patent rights' omvat, onuitvoerbaar is na de datum waarop het octrooi is verlopen, tenzij de overeenkomst 'a discounted rate for the non-patent rights' bevat 'or some other clear indication that the royalty at issue was in no way subject to patent leverage'.

Kimble further contends that this case is distinguishable because it involved a “hybrid” agreement, that coincidentally included both patent and non-patent rights, as opposed to a “hybrid” product, consisting of both patented and nonpatented ideas. Cf. Boggild, 776 F.2d at 1319 (applying Brulotte to a “patented item”). The flaw with Kimble’s argument is that at the time of the Settlement Agreement, it was uncertain whether the Web Blaster sales infringed the ‘856 Patent and the Settlement Agreement does not contain any clear indication that the Web Blaster royalties were not subject to patent leverage.

(...)We acknowledge our application of the Brulotte rule in this case arguably deprives Kimble of part of the benefit of his bargain based upon a technical detail that both parties regarded as insignificant at the time of the agreement. Indeed, as the Seventh Circuit has explained, Brulotte has been criticized for exactly that reason:

The Supreme Court’s majority opinion reasoned that by extracting a promise to continue paying royalties after expiration of the patent, the patentee extends the patent beyond the term fixed in the patent statute and therefore in violation of the law. That is not true. After the patent expires, anyone can make the patented process or product without being guilty of patent infringement. The patent can no longer be used to exclude anybody from such production. Expiration thus accomplishes what it is supposed to accomplish. For a licensee in accordance with a provision in the license agreement to go on paying royalties after the patent expires does not extend the duration of the patent either technically or practically, because . . . if the licensee agrees to continue paying royalties after the patent expires the royalty rate will be lower. The duration of the patent fixes the limit of the patentee’s power to extract royalties; it is a detail whether he extracts them at a higher rate over a shorter period of time or a lower rate over a longer period of time.

Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2002).

The Seventh Circuit’s criticism is particularly apt in this case. The patent leverage in this case was vastly overshadowed by what were likely non-patent rights, and Kimble may have been able to obtain a higher royalty rate had the parties understood that the royalty payments would stop when the patent expired. Nonetheless, Brulotte and its progeny are controlling. We are bound to follow Brulotte and cannot deny that it applies here. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

Hieronder een overzicht van een elftal recent gepubliceerde uitspraken in Duitse procedures, KluwerPatentBlog.

Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), 19 February 2013, Kluwer Patent Blog (Wundverband)
by Anja Petersen Hoffmann Eitle , for Kluwer Patent Cases If the patentee has granted an exclusive license after filing an infringement action, an exclusive licensee is (in part) a legal successor of the patentee. Therefore, as long as the patentee’s claims are pending at another German court, the exclusive licensee has no right to sue with regard to the same subject matter due to the force of res judicata of the judgment against the legal successor and the lis pendens rule. The final decision against the patentee will have binding effect against the licensee as well.

Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), 15 January 2013, Kluwer Patent Blog (Messelektronik fuer Coriolisdurchflussmesser)
by Jochen Buehling , for Kluwer Patent Cases The Federal Court of Justice held that under the specific circumstances of the case it was likely that a service manual regarding flow meter technology had been available to third parties. The Court considered as decisive the agreement between the party supplying the manual and the recipient. According to the Court it is relevant whether the parties agreed upon confidentiality either expressly or implicitly or whether it was to be expected under the circumstances that the recipient would keep the information confidential.

Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), 5 February 2013, Kluwer Patent Blog (Genveraenderungen)
by Jochen Buehling , for Kluwer Patent Cases According to the law on employee inventions, the inventor is entitled to information about all income generated by the employer from third parties in exploiting the invention. This information is the basis for claims of the employees against the employer for compensation. The Court confirmed the decisions of the lower courts and held that the income of the employer comprises all financial benefits related to the employees’ invention and its exploitation. This includes not only payments made to the employer but also other benefits such as patent protection.

Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), 18 December 2012, Kluwer Patent Blog (Doppelvertretung im Nichtigkeitsverfahren)
by Jochen Buehling , for Kluwer Patent Cases Regarding the question whether costs for double representation of a party by a patent attorney and an attorney-at-law are reimbursable the Court held that these costs are to be reimbursed at least in a situation where parallel infringement proceedings concerning the same patent are pending before a civil court and in which the same party or an affiliate of that party is involved.

Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), 19 July 2012, Kluwer Patent Blog (Take Five)
by Jochen Buehling , for Kluwer Patent Cases In an earlier decision (BGH M2Trade), the Court held that the termination of the main license agreement does not automatically lead to a termination of the sublicense. It remains in force when the main license is terminated for reasons such as a mutual agreement of the main licensor and the main licensee who is also the sub-licensor. The Court applied this principle in the present case in which the license was exclusive. According to the Court, the interests of the sub-licensee were to prevail over the interests of the main licensor.

Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), 19 July 2012, Kluwer Patent Blog (M2Trade)
by Jochen Buehling , for Kluwer Patent Cases Although the right of the main licensee to use the invention automatically fell back to the licensor upon the licensee’s insolvency, the Court held that the sublicensee enjoys protection of succession and that the sublicense continued to exist despite the termination of the main license.

Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), 24 July 2012, Kluwer Patent Blog (Leflunomide)
by Thorsten Bausch Hoffmann Eitle and Bernd Kröger. A combination of two pharmaceutical ingredients, i.e. leflunomide and teriflunomide is to be considered obvious if the person skilled in the art uses an obvious process to obtain leflunomide that automatically results in – even with a certain delay – both components due to a chemical reaction.

Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), 23 October 2012, Kluwer Patent Blog (Sachverstaendigenablehnung VI)
by Jochen Buehling , for Kluwer Patent Cases The Court held that a lack of impartiality of a court-appointed expert can be assumed if the expert maintains a close economic relationship with one of the parties. This is not necessarily so where the expert was engaged by a third party that maintains a consulting relationship with one of the parties.

Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), 20 November 2012, Kluwer Patent Blog (Fuehrungsschiene)
by Jochen Buehling , for Kluwer Patent Cases This decision deals with a court order to obtain an expert opinion in a nullity appeal proceeding subject to the new procedural rules that apply to nullity actions filed since October 1, 2009. Due to revised rules in nullity appeal proceedings, as a general rule, the appeal court shall decide on legal questions only, and not questions of fact such as expert opinions. However, the Court held that regarding facts relevant for novelty or inventive step it, the appointment of a court expert to clarify the factual background is still admissible, even if the relevant facts were already a subject in the first instance proceedings.

Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), 28 August 2012, Kluwer Patent Blog (Fahrzeugwechselstromgenerator)
by Jochen Buehling , for Kluwer Patent Cases The Appeals Court held that an argument that was not raised in first instance proceedings, shall not be considered a new matter, and consequently be dismissed, if it only further specifies or clarifies the line of argumentation in first instance. On the other hand, f the plaintiff refers to the specifics of a technical teaching disclosed in prior art for the first time at the appeal stage in order to support a nullity attack, it shall be considered a new matter, even if this prior art was already filed in first instance.

Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), 13 November 2011, Kluwer Patent Blog (Diglycidverbindung (Diglycidyl Compounds))
by Jochen Buehling , for Kluwer Patent Cases Under the doctrine of equivalents, a patent does not convey protection for all options disclosed in the broader patent description if these options are not specifically included in the patent claims.