Geen verwarringsgevaar tussen Trident Pure en Pure Fresh/White

Gerecht EU 16 december 2015, IEFbe 1624; ECLI:EU:T:2015:979 (Perfetti Van Melle tegen OHIM)
Uitspraak ingezonden door Maarten Haak, Hoogenraad & Haak Advertising + IP Advocaten. Merkenrecht. Kraft Foods Global Brand heeft bij het OHIM een aanvraag ingediend voor het Gemeenschapsmerk TRIDENT PURE. Perfetti gaat in oppositie tegen deze aanvraag, gebaseerd op eerdere merken (art. 8(1)(b) Gemeenschapsmerkenverordening). Oppositie divisie wijst de oppositie toe op grond van verwarringsgevaar. De kamer van beroep vernietigt deze beslissing. Perfetti vordert voor het Gerecht om aanpassing uitspraak van de kamer van beroep en dat de aanvraag voor een merkdepot wordt afgewezen. Het Gerecht merkt op dat de kamer van beroep bij de beoordeling van het onderscheidende karakter van “pure" terecht onderscheid heeft gemaakt tussen het deel van het publiek dat het woord wel kent en het deel dat het woord niet kent. Dit heeft tevens invloed op de vergelijking van de merken en het verwarringsgevaar. Zo is het begripsmatige overeenstemming voor het publiek dat het woord “pure” niet kent neutraal. Net als de kamer van beroep oordeelt het Gerecht dat er geen verwarringsgevaar bestaat tussen beide merken. Het beroep wordt verworpen.

3.     The comparison of the signs and the likelihood of confusion

44      In the present case, the word element ‘pure’ exists in English and also in a similar form in other languages, including Italian (puro), French (pur), Spanish (puro), Portuguese (puro), German (pur), and Dutch (puur), which is the reason why it may be assumed that that word will be understood by consumers in those countries. In other languages, however, the word has no equivalent originating from the same stem (‘pur-’). While it is true that a large portion of the population of those language areas will understand the English word ‘pure’, which forms part of the basic vocabulary frequently used in advertising to describe the characteristics of goods, it nevertheless cannot be accepted, contrary to what the intervener submits, that, in the absence of any supporting evidence, it is understood throughout the territory of the European Union. The Board of Appeal therefore correctly found that there was a significant number of consumers for whom the word ‘pure’ was devoid of any meaning. For that portion of the relevant public, the word is fanciful and has, as the Board of Appeal correctly found, an average inherent distinctiveness, which, moreover, is not disputed by the applicant.

47 In the first place, the argument that the word ‘pure’ is not commonly used in confectionery and candy advertisements and that purity is not a characteristic of those goods does not resolve the question of how the relevant public will perceive that word element. That question does not depend on whether or not that word element is frequently used in advertisements or whether use of that element in the context of marketing a product is logically or scientifically correct. The only relevant question in this case, for the purposes of determining whether the element ‘pure’ is distinctive or whether it is, on the contrary, descriptive, is whether or not use of a term in the marketing of a product leads the consumer to perceive that term as a description of the product, since a word mark which is descriptive of the characteristics of goods or services is, on that account, necessarily devoid of any distinctive character in relation to those goods or services (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 March 2012 in Kaltenbach & Voigt v OHIM (3D eXam), T‑242/11, EU:T:2012:179, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

48      In the second place, the applicant’s argument that the distinctiveness of the element ‘pure’ is even greater given that the applicant has demonstrated intensive use of a family of trade marks that share the element ‘pure’ is unrelated to the question of whether the inherent distinctiveness of an element of a composite mark is higher or lower. This argument will be addressed in the context of the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion.

49      In the third place, the applicant’s argument that OHIM’s decision-making practice indicates that the word element ‘pure’ is not descriptive also cannot succeed. The applicant relies, first, on the decision of the Opposition Division of OHIM of 29 August 2011 in Case B 1 771 164, Pure Collection Limited v Tina Baum. At page 7 of that decision, the Opposition Division noted that the word element ‘pure’ had no particular meaning in relation to the goods at issue, namely clothing, footwear and bags adapted for sporting articles. Consequently, the Opposition Division found that the distinctive character of the word element ‘pure’ was normal. However, contrary to what the applicant apparently infers from that decision, the Opposition Division in no way concluded that the element ‘pure’ had, as a general rule, an average distinctive character. Although it is true that the element ‘pure’ did not characterise the goods at issue in that case, the same reasoning cannot apply to the goods in the present case, as has been shown in paragraph 45 above. Second, the applicant relies on the decision of the Opposition Division of OHIM of 18 February 2013 in Case B 1 916 546, Euroquimica SA v The Dial Corporation. That case involved laundry detergents sold under the marks PUREX and PUREX COMPLETE. The Opposition Division concluded, at page 6 of that decision, that the word ‘purex’ had no meaning for a major part of the relevant public, comprising the Spanish public, whereas it would be associated by a small portion of consumers in that public with the concept of purity of the detergent derived from use of the product. The Opposition Division stated that, for that smaller part of the relevant public, the word elements ‘purex’ and ‘complete’ had an equivalent distinctive character. With regard to the mark PUREX, the Opposition Division stated that that word was distinctive even for consumers who associated it with the concept of the purity or cleanliness of detergent, since that word does not exist in Spanish as such. However, it cannot be inferred from the reasoning followed by the Opposition Division in that case that the word element ‘pure’, in the present case, also has a distinctive character, since the comparison made by the Opposition Division in the case mentioned above did not involve the word ‘pure’, but a different expression. It follows that the decisions relied on by the party relate to circumstances that differ significantly from those in the present case and that they are, therefore, not relevant to the outcome of the present dispute.

50      It must therefore be concluded that the Board of Appeal acted correctly in finding that, for the part of the relevant public that understood the meaning of the word ‘pure’, that word was descriptive. As has been shown in paragraph 45 above, the word element ‘pure’ has a sufficiently direct and specific link with the goods in question to enable consumers immediately to perceive, without further thought, a description of one of the characteristics of those goods. For those consumers who understand the word ‘pure’, that term is, therefore, devoid of any distinctive character (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 27 February 2002 in REWE-Zentral v OHIM (LITE), T‑79/00, ECR, EU:T:2002:42, paragraphs 35 to 39). By contrast, for those consumers who do not understand the meaning of the word ‘pure’, the element ‘pure’ is, as the Board of Appeal correctly concluded, without being challenged on this point by the parties, a fanciful term endowed with average distinctive character.

 The comparison between the mark applied for and Community figurative mark No 9291634 (word element ‘pure’ above a design representing a mint leaf) and the likelihood of confusion

107    In the light of all of the foregoing, the view must therefore be taken that, for those consumers who do not understand the word ‘pure’, the differences which have been identified between the marks at issue, particularly the critical importance that consumers attribute to visual appearance characterised, as regards the earlier mark, by the significant role played by the figurative element and, as regards the mark applied for, by its beginning, are sufficient to lessen phonetic similarity even for the category of consumers who pronounce the word ‘pure’ in two syllables. It must therefore be held that the overall impressions created by the marks at issue are, despite the similarities identified, sufficiently different to justify the conclusion that there is no likelihood of confusion for consumers who do not understand the word ‘pure’.

108    For those consumers who do understand that word, any likelihood of confusion must also a fortiori be ruled out, since, first, those consumers will attribute even less importance to the element ‘pure’, which to them is merely descriptive, and, second, the impact of the identified conceptual similarity on the overall impression created by the marks at issue is very low and is thus not decisive for the purposes of the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion. The conceptual similarity results solely from the descriptive element ‘pure’, which attracts those consumers’ attention only in a limited manner.

109    Accordingly, the Board of Appeal was right to conclude that there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue, even if it committed two errors, first, in concluding that there was no visual similarity between those marks and, second, in taking the view that the conceptual similarity of those marks resulting from the presence of the word element ‘pure’ was not relevant for the purposes of the conceptual comparison. However, those errors had no bearing on the result of the assessment which it carried out.

The comparison between the mark applied for and Community trade mark No 6771869 (PURE WHITE) and the likelihood of confusion

120    With regard to the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion between the two marks, it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that, for those consumers who do not understand the words ‘pure’ and ‘white’, the marks at issue are of low visual similarity and are, at most, of average phonetic similarity and are each of average distinctiveness. As has been demonstrated in paragraph 101 above, the applicant has proved neither that there was an enhanced distinctive character by reason of use nor that there was a family of trade marks. Taking into account the fact that, first, consumers pay more attention to the beginnings of marks than to their ends and that, second, visual appearance plays a more important role than phonetic appearance in the present case, it must be concluded that there is no likelihood of confusion for consumers who understand neither the word ‘pure’ nor the word ‘white’. For those consumers who understand the word ‘pure’, but not the word ‘white’, the differences between the marks at issue are even greater, since these consumers attach more weight to the elements which they do not understand, with the result that the only element which those marks have in common, namely the element ‘pure’, will attract their attention less in comparison with consumers who understand neither of the words ‘pure’ and ‘white’. Finally, for the reasons set out in paragraph 108 above, the same conclusion must apply in regard to consumers who do understand the words ‘pure’ and ‘white’.

121    Accordingly, the Board of Appeal was correct to exclude, also for Community trade mark No 6771869, all likelihood of confusion for all groups of consumers.

The comparison between the mark applied for and French word mark No 63431610 (PURE FRESH)

125    With regard to the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, it is appropriate to refer, in essence, to the findings already made in the context of the examination of the other marks examined. Given that the similarities between the marks at issue are even less evident than in the context of the other marks examined and that the element ‘pure’ is descriptive for all of the relevant public concerned, the Board of Appeal’s conclusion — that a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue is excluded — must be endorsed.

The comparison between the mark applied for and the other earlier marks relied on by the applicant

132    In that regard, it must be pointed out that the applicant has provided no evidence capable of proving that the umbrella brand MENTOS was widely known by the relevant public. Even on the assumption that it has been proved that the element ‘mentos’ was readily known by the relevant public, that element is not, for that reason, less important for the purposes of the comparison of the signs at issue. On the contrary, the Court of Justice has indicated that the overall impression produced by a mark made up of a widely-known element and an element which was not widely known was, as a general rule, characterised more by the former than by the latter (see, to that effect, judgment in Medion, paragraph 76 above, EU:C:2005:594, paragraph 34). It must also be pointed out that a widely-known word element incorporated in a composite mark is particularly appropriate for indicating the commercial origin of the goods sold under that mark, for which reason it is impossible to regard such an element as ancillary, or even as negligible.