EHRM: Vrijheid van meningsuiting gaat boven de noodzaak tot staking en bescherming van de universiteit

EHRM 8 oktober 2015, IEFbe 1538; Application no. 27447/07 (Kharlamov tegen Russia) - persbericht.
Recht op vrijheid meningsuiting. Zaak tegen de heer Kharlamov, professor aan de Universiteit Orel State Technical University. Hij stelde zich op het standpunt dat het bestuursorgaan van de universiteit niet legitiem kon worden beschouwd als gevolg van tekortkomingen in de verkiezingsprocedure. Het Hof constateerde dat de nationale rechter geen rekening heeft gehouden met de specifieke kenmerken van academische relaties, zoals in het bijzonder de bescherming van autoriteit van universiteit of de reputatie. Dit kan niet worden gelijk gesteld met die van een individu. De nationale rechter heeft geen billijk evenwicht gevonden tussen de noodzaak tot staking en de bescherming van de universiteit tegenover de vrijheid van meningsuiting over de academische organisatie. Oftewel, schending van art. 10 EVRM: vrijheid van meningsuiting.

29. (...) In the present case there is no evidence that the domestic courts performed a balancing exercise between the need to protect the University’s reputation and the applicant’s right to impart information on issues of general interest concerning the organization of the academic life. They merely confined their analysis to the discussion of the damage to the plaintiff’s reputation (see paragraph 10 above) without giving any due consideration to the Convention standards described above. Neither did the domestic courts consider that the “dignity” of an institution cannot be equated to that of human beings. The Court considers that the protection of the University’s authority is a mere institutional interest of the University, that is, a consideration not necessarily of the same strength as “the protection of the reputation or rights of others” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 (see Uj v. Hungary, no. 23954/10, § 22, 19 July 2011). The Court therefore finds that the domestic courts did not take into account specific features of academic relations and failed to recognise that the present case involved a conflict between the right to freedom of expression and the protection of reputation (see Dyundin v. Russia, no. 37406/03, § 33, 14 October 2008).
33. In conclusion, the Court finds that the domestic courts failed to strike a fair balance between the relevant interests and to establish a “pressing social need” for putting the protection of the plaintiff’s reputation above the applicant’s right to freedom of expression. Therefore, the Court considers that the domestic courts overstepped the narrow margin of appreciation afforded to them in the matters of debate of public interest and that the interference was not “necessary in a democratic society”.
34. There has therefore been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.